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Abstract
This paper studies the relationship between regulation and perfor-
mance in the mobile telecommunications sector. The analysis takes ac-
count of the economic impact of telecommunications infrastructure on
aggregate income and of the role of country institutions in promoting
economic growth. More specically, we try to separate the impact of reg-
ulation from the potential indirect e¤ects due to country institutions. We
address these questions by estimating a system of equations for a panel of
30 low and middle-income countries over the 1990 - 2004 period. In sum-
mary, the evidence we present conrms the positive e¤ect of regulatory
institutions on telecommunications penetration and also highlights the
contribution of a more widespread mobile telecommunications infrastruc-
ture to higher levels of GDP per capita.
Keywords: Telecommunications, Regulation, Institutions, Growth
JEL Classication: L51, L96, O43
1 Introduction
In developing countries, liberalization, restructuring, privatization and the intro-
duction of independent regulatory agencies for infrastructure industries appear
to have generally been successful in improving sector performance in terms of
higher investment and service availability, particularly in telecommunications.
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However, the specic policies and factors behind both reform successes and fail-
ure are the subject of intense debate. There has also been much discussion of
their relative contributions, positive and negative.
The relationship between the existence of an independent regulator and the
development of infrastructure industry investment and productivity levels has
been a particular focus of debate and this specic issue has been investigated in
numerous papers, with reference both to the telecommunications and electricity
sectors (Gutierrez, 2003; Cubbin and Stern, 2006). These studies focus on the
characteristics of regulatory institutions that tend to be associated with higher
levels of certain performance indicators in public utilities, such as the electricity
produced or the number of telephone lines per inhabitant. The independence of
the regulator is generally a major explanatory variable, following the literature
on central bank independence (e.g. review in Stern and Trillas, 2003). However,
this literature does not, with some exceptions, pay much explicit attention to
the institutional setting within which the new regulatory agencies operate.
This paper takes a fresh look at the relationship between regulation and
performance in the telecommunications sector, by drawing lessons from strands
of the economic literature that are sometimes neglected in previous studies and,
in particular attending to the role of the institutional setting. In consequence,
we also take account of further interrelated e¤ects, in particular (a) the economic
impact of telecommunications infrastructure on the growth of aggregate income;
and (b) the role of country institutions in promoting economic growth.
Concerning the relationship between telecommunications penetration and
national income, income is considered one of the most important determinants
of demand for telecommunications services. But, in addition, investment in
telecommunications infrastructure can contribute to economic growth directly
by an increase in production and, indirectly, by facilitating communications
between rms, thus increasing their production possibilities (Röller and Waver-
man, 2001).
We explicitly include this feedback e¤ect in the present analysis to provide
a fuller picture of the interrelationship between income and telecommunications
infrastructure capacity. We do this by focusing on the case of mobile telephony
where recent research has suggested sizeable impacts of the rapid expansion of
mobile telephones subscribers on GDP levels and growth rates in middle and low
income countries.1 (See Waverman et al. (2005) for a major recent example).
Another related issue that is considered in the paper is the role of country in-
stitutions. When investigating the impact of regulation on telecommunications
development, it is crucial to ensure that this e¤ect does not capture other factors
which are not explicitly included in the analysis. More specically, the paper
tries to separate the impact of regulation from the potential indirect e¤ects due
to country institutions.
The present study attempts to bring together these questions into a unied
framework of analysis. We do this by estimating a system of equations for a
1Following the International Telecommunications Union (ITU), the denition of subscribers
includes both pre-paid and post-paid users of telephone mobile services.
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panel of 30 low and middle-income countries over the 1990 - 2004 period.
In summary, the evidence we present conrms the positive e¤ect of regu-
latory institutions on telecommunications penetration and also highlights the
contribution of a more widespread telecommunications infrastructure to higher
levels of GDP per capita at least for mobile telecom services. However, explain-
ing regulatory governance choices, on the basis of country institutions and other
factors, is more challenging and the results we have so far obtained in this area
are less convincing.
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 reviews the most relevant
results from the related literature. Section 3 sets out the approach adopted in
the paper; Section 4 provides a description of the data; Section 5 sets out the
empirical strategy; Section 6 discusses the main results; and Section 7 provides
some short concluding comments.
2 Related Literature
The standard perspective on utility industries is that the existence of very
long-lived, sunk assets means that the relationship between governments and
investors gives rise to a time inconsistency problem. This time inconsistency
problem is very similar to that which a¤ects macroeconomic policy.2 In essence,
this inconsistency is the inability of the public authority to commit credibly to
an optimal policy. When the ability to commit is key to e¤ective policy making,
this lack of credibility may lead to ine¢ cient outcomes.
In the telecommunications industry, if the public authority cannot commit
to future price levels credibly, that is to refrain from lowering prices beyond the
originally declared targets, the operator will anticipate the authoritys incentive
to appropriate its return on sunk investment. As a result, the operator may
choose a lower than optimal level of investment. The establishment of an inde-
pendent regulator is seen as a way of addressing this commitment problem and
of safeguarding consumers at the same time, mainly because it should be bet-
ter insulated from political pressure and therefore less inclined to pursue policy
objectives through arbitrary intervention in the regulated sector.3
In consequence, there is a growing body of empirical evidence looking at the
relationship between the presence of an independent regulator and investment
in the telecommunications network, mirroring the extensive literature testing
the impact of independent central banks on ination and growth. The most
relevant papers for the present work are discussed in this Section.
Gutierrez (2003) is the recent contribution which is the most closely related
to our study. Using a panel of 22 Latin American countries over the period
1980 -1997, he nds that good regulatory governance has a positive impact on
xed linesdeployment and e¢ ciency (measured as employees per main lines).
2See Levine, Stern and Trillas (2005).
3For instance, see Levine and Rickman (2002) for the theoretical underpinnings in a model
of price regulation under asymmetric information.
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In Gutierrez (2003), the main explanatory variables are privatization, compe-
tition and regulatory development, where the latter is represented by an index
covering, for instance, whether there is separation of telecom operations and
regulatory activities and whether the creation of the regulator is backed by law
or by a minor legal norm.
The main advantage of Gutierrezs index is the attempt to characterize reg-
ulatory governance in a more comprehensive way than allowed by a simple
dummy variable for the presence of the regulator, thus recognizing that the
mere existence of an independent regulator is not by itself informative of the
quality of institutions. Moreover, he addresses the potential endogeneity of the
regulatory variable in his dynamic model. However, his analysis is based on a
reduced-form equation that neglects the potential interactions among network
deployment, income level and regulatory governance. In addition, the results
from his dynamic model should be treated with caution, as explained in Section
6 below.
In a recent paper, Gual and Trillas (2006) investigate the determinants of
reforms concerning regulatorsindependence and entry barriers in the telecom-
munications sector. In particular, they dene independence by an index covering
the regulators functions, its funding, the years since establishment and the per-
centage of private ownership, among other factors. Regulatory independence is
regressed on explanatory variables, which include proxies of country institutions
used in the growth literature, such as the legal origin of the country, the general
quality of government and the rule of law.4
Gual and Trillas nd that the rule of law variable has a signicant negative
impact on independence. They explain this result arguing that "independence
is a substitute for other ways to achieve commitment not to expropriate".5
This interpretation is consistent with the view of the independent regulator
as an answer to the commitment problem, as summarized above. However,
other researchers (e.g. Cubbin and Stern, 2006) nd that the rule of law is a
complement to better quality regulation rather than a substitute.
An alternative approach is to look at specic policy outcomes rather than
actual network development. In Edwards and Waverman (2005), for instance,
interconnection rates are the dependent variable which is explained by an in-
dex of regulatory governance and other controls in a panel data context. This
approach has the appeal of narrowing the focus to an outcome which is more
related to institutional quality than measures of performance, and of simplifying
the empirical methodology.
However, the Edwards-Waverman approach does not seem suited for the re-
search question of the present study. Firstly, there are no available time-series
4Those variables relating to the wider institutional environment have been used as the
explanatory variable of interest by Henisz and Zelner (2001), who focus on institutions at
the macro-political level. They create an index of political constraints for 147 countries over
the period 1960-1994 and they nd that it has a positive impact on telecommunications
infrastructure development.
5 Interestingly, other measures of institutions, such as the Polcon index developed by Henisz
and Zelner (2001), a measure of procedural complexity (i.e. the number of steps a new rm
has to take to operate) and a variable of government e¤ectiveness were not signicant.
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data on policy outcomes for a su¢ ciently large set of low and middle-income
countries. In addition, as a more general point, this type of approach would
implicitly assume that a given policy outcome automatically leads to a higher
degree of development of telecommunications networks. The more relevant ques-
tion for this paper is precisely to explain the development of telecommunications,
rather than assuming that it would follow from the "right" type of policies.
Most papers on regulatory institutions usually analyze the direct impact of
regulatory governance on outcomes, while other types of institutions are not
considered.6 A notable exception is Cubbin and Stern (2006), who try to es-
timate the impact of country institutions on outcomes in the electricity sector
and nd that there is no signicant statistical evidence of the impact of coun-
try governance in models that incorporate country xed e¤ects, once regulatory
governance is controlled for. The methodology proposed in the present paper
will address this issue in the context of a system of simultaneous equations.
Finally, all these studies rely on formal measures of institutional quality
which, in developing countries, may not be indicative of the e¤ective degree of
regulatory governance (Pande and Udry, 2005). Attempts to provide de facto
measures of independence, i.e. taking account of how regulators and govern-
ments actually operate in practice, have been introduced in the literature on
central banks independence by Cukierman (1994) and Haan and Koi (2000) and
are currently being developed for utilities (Montoya and Trillas, forthcoming).
3 Main Issues and Methodology
The focus of this paper is the relationship between measures of telecommuni-
cations development and regulatory governance, while taking explicit account
within a system framework of (a) the role of income and (b) other institutions
and country governance. In this section we outline a framework to address these
issues. We rstly describe the scope of the study; and, secondly, briey explain
the approach followed in the paper.
The present work studies the penetration of telecommunications infrastruc-
ture, as measured by the number of mobile telephone subscribers per head.
Analyzing the overall performance of a sector (e.g. penetration, productivity,
quality of service) addresses wider questions than focusing only on specic reg-
ulatory outcomes, such as the level of interconnection prices, as explained in
Section 2.
Among the factors that may a¤ect penetration, we consider the e¤ect that
income may have on the uptake of mobile telephone subscriptions. This is re-
lated to the question of whether penetration is demand-constrained or supply-
constrained in developing countries. Case-study evidence, as well as the substan-
tial waiting lists for xed telephone lines, points to supply-side limits, rather
6The paper by Henisz and Zelner (2001) focuses on the e¤ect of country institutions on
telecommunications investment. Esfahani and Ramirez (2003) study the impact of executive
constraints on growth and on the growth of telephones per capita.
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than low levels of demand, as the main reason for the limited penetration of
telecommunications services in developing countries (World Bank, 2005).
Another consideration relates to the possible feedback e¤ects between pene-
tration and income. Network infrastructure services, including telecommunica-
tions, play a crucial role for the economy.7 There is now considerable evidence
that higher telecommunications capacity xed and mobile can have sizeable
e¤ects on the level of income.8
The importance of the telecommunications sector in improving a countrys
income level is a major complication when analyzing the factors that inu-
ence telecommunications penetration rates. While it is usually maintained in
the literature that income is among the variables a¤ecting infrastructure de-
velopment, the economic feedback impact of telecommunications infrastructure
capacity also needs to be modelled if we are not to have a misleading picture.
This is represented by the two-sided arrow in the top row of Figure 1.
Country Institutions GDP/growth
Regulatory Governance
Regulatory Governance Infrastructure Development
GDP Infrastructure Development
Figure 1: Factors Potentially A¤ecting Infrastructure Development
Considering the second row of Figure 1, the economic importance of the
telecommunications industry has been among the factors contributing to the
active role of governments in this sector. The reform process that has taken
place in developed countries and in many low and middle-income countries aims
at achieving public interest targets by complex policy changes, in which the es-
tablishment of a regulatory framework is accompanied by sector restructuring,
the liberalization of the market and the privatization of the incumbent. Put
at its simplest, introducing private nance and privatizing expanding telecom-
munications industries has been the main force behind the development of new
regulatory organizations as well as, arguably, encouraging general improvements
in country governance in the areas of commercial law enforcement.
The present study concentrates on the regulatory framework for telecom-
munications per se and, in particular, on key aspects of regulatory governance
(e.g. the autonomy of the regulator). As described in the literature review,
regulatory reform has the stated objective of promoting better infrastructure
7See Canning (1999) and Canning and Bennathan (2000).
8See Correa (2006), Esfahani and Ramirez (2003), Röller and Waverman (2001) and Wa-
verman et al. (2005).
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development, among other targets, by attracting investment and lowering the
cost of capital. This e¤ect is symbolized by the arrow in the middle panel of
Figure 1.9
Typically, the regulatory framework is adapted to the countrys specicity
and, in particular, to its quality of governance. This is shown in the third part of
Figure 1. A possible interpretation of this relationship views the establishment
of an independent regulator as a substitute for strong country institutions (i.e.
that could commit credibly to a given policy). However, it is equally sensible
to assume that a country with strong institutions may be more likely to engage
in reform, which is likely to result in high quality regulatory governance. This
tentative relationship is represented by the dotted lines in the lower panel of
Figure 1.
Finally, as highlighted by the literature on institutions and growth, the po-
tential e¤ect of country institutions on income should also be incorporated in
the analysis.
3.1 Summary of the Approach
In order to deal with the interactions described above and represented in Figure
1, a system of simultaneous equations is estimated in which the dependent vari-
ables are infrastructure development, income and regulatory governance. This
approach assumes that these variables are endogenous, i.e. they are assumed to
be determined within the model rather than as being given from outside it.
As will be explained in more detail in Section 5 below, the basic econo-
metric specication consists of three equations, which have been derived from
theory or from previous empirical studies. In the rst equation, the penetra-
tion of telecommunications infrastructure is explained by income, regulatory
governance, investment in telecommunications and other variables. The second
equation relates income levels to the penetration of telecommunications, a mea-
sure of country institutions and other variables. Finally, in the third equation,
regulatory governance is explained by income, country institutions and other
variables.
Jointly estimating the system of equations presents the advantage of im-
proving the e¢ ciency of the estimates, compared to the results obtained by
instrumental variables estimators on each equation. However, with systems es-
timation, if the structure of the model is misspecied, any modelling error in
any one equation will be propagated through the system. In consequence, in
Section 5, we compare estimates for the system with those obtained for the
single equations, also using instrumental variables to handle the endogeneity
issue.
9 It may be argued that countries with more widespread telecommunications penetration
are more likely to set up regulators and that therefore there may be some feedback e¤ects
from infrastructure development to regulatory governance. In fact, this apparent feedback
may instead be related to other factors, such as liberalization or privatization, a¤ecting both
regulatory governance and infrastructure development.
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The limitations of the analysis are mainly related to the measurement of
the governance variables. Firstly, in common with other studies (but see a
new dataset in Montoya and Trillas, forthcoming), regulatory governance is
measured on the basis of formal characteristics of the legal framework, such as
the existence of the regulator and the way it is funded. However, this may not
coincide with the actual governance of the regulatory authority i.e. how the
regulator operates and is allowed by the government to operate - in practice.
Secondly, related to the previous point, in this paper the only available
measure of regulatory governance for all our countries is a dichotomous variable
which takes value one when a certain characteristic is present (e.g. regulator
separate from Ministry, autonomous funding) and zero otherwise. This type of
variable does not allow us to quantify di¤erences between countriesregulators
in any detail. However, compared to an index-type variable,10 it is more suitable
for system estimation.
Thirdly, country institutions are among the explanatory variables in the
system. There is an open question of the potential endogeneity of country insti-
tutions. This is a key and hotly debated theme in the literature on institutions
and growth. In the present study, the issue is addressed by treating the proxies
for country institutions as predetermined for the year in question.11 This ap-
proach is motivated by institutionsstrong persistence over time, especially in
relation to the limited timeframe of the present sample.
Unlike previous studies on regulatory governance in telecommunications, this
paper focuses on mobile communications, in order better to tailor the analysis
for low and middle-income countries. Given the substantial sunk investments
to deploy the xed network and the chronic waiting lists, mobile phones have
proved formidable substitutes for xed lines in developing countries.
In terms of methodology, the main advantage of this approach is that we es-
timate a system of equations rather than a single reduced form equation that is
informed by the underlying economic relationships. This should allow to inves-
tigate much more thoroughly the interactions described above, which perforce
are either ignored or only implicitly modelled in the single equation reduced
form model. For instance, our approach can shed light on the economic factors
that determine the quality of regulatory governance and, potentially, on mobile
telecom penetration. In particular, it allows testing whether and how far coun-
try general institutions are a driver of mobile penetration through their indirect
e¤ects on infrastructure regulation and on income levels.
Secondly, a key di¤erence compared with previous papers is that they do
not consider the e¤ect of telecommunications infrastructure on income. The
10For example, as explained in Section 2, Gutierrez (2003) measures regulatory quality by
an index which includes six di¤erent components, such as whether the regulator is separate
from the Ministry and whether it is independently funded. A similar approach is also followed
by Cubbin and Stern (2006). In both studies, the index of regulatory quality is an explanatory
variable, rather than a dependent variable as in the present paper. Such indexes typically can
take only a discrete number of values and, therefore, cannot be treated as continuous variables
in the estimation. For this reason, it is simpler to have a dummy variable rather than the
ordered data that would result from an index.
11For instance, see Rajan and Zingales (1998).
8
failure to treat income as endogenous can readily lead to biased results in a
reduced-form equation. The approach proposed in the paper should provide
more reliable results by explicitly allowing for income to be endogenous.
Thirdly, the paper also relates to studies measuring the impact of telecom-
munications penetration on income. In this respect, this papers contribution is
the explicit inclusion of regulatory governance and country institutions in the
framework of analysis.12
Finally, the present dataset includes a reasonably large set of developing
countries only (30 countries). Hence, we have a more homogenous group of
countries than in most previous studies. The latter have generally combined
both developed and developing countries and therefore implicitly assume that
a common model holds for very di¤erent countries (e.g. Wallsten (2003) and
Waverman et al. (2005) for the cross-section results).
4 Description of the Sample
Our dataset consists of an unbalanced panel of yearly data on 30 low-income and
middle-income countries over the period 1990 to 2004. The main sources for the
data are the International Telecommunications Union (ITU) World Telecom-
munications Indicators and the World Development Indicators from the World
Bank. This Section describes the main variables, while details on the other
variables included in the analysis are provided in Appendix 1.
Telecommunications penetration is measured by the number of mobile sub-
scribers per 100 inhabitants, as explained in Appendix 1. In line with other
studies (Gutierrez, 2003; Roller and Waverman, 2001), GDP per capita is mea-
sured in constant U.S. dollars.
For regulatory governance, a limited number of indicators have been chosen.
These include: whether (a) the country has passed a framework law for the
telecommunications sector; (b) the country has established a regulator as a
separate entity from the policy maker;13 and (c) the regulator is not funded
by the Governments budget. In addition, the years since the creation of the
regulator is also considered in order to capture the time necessary to build up
sta¤ numbers and competences and reputation, as in Cubbin and Stern (2006).
Data sources for these regulatory variables include the International Telecom-
munications Union (ITU) online database on country and regulators proles,14
Henisz, Zelner and Guillen (2004), Wallsten et al. (2004)15 and the regulators
websites.
12Waverman et al. (2005) include a rule of law measure, while Esfahani and Ramirez (2003)
include a dummy for private ownership.
13The year in which the law establishing the regulator was passed may di¤er from the year
when the regulator was actually set up. In most countries in our sample, they coincide. For
Belize, it was not possible to identify the law setting up the regulator.
14http://www.itu.int/ITU-D/treg/proles/guide.asp?lang=en
15http://www.aei-brookings.org/publications/abstract.php?pid=724 Scott Wallsten,
George Clarke, Luke Haggarty, Rosario Kaneshiro, Roger Noll, Mary Shirley, and Lixin
Colin Xu. "New Tools for Studying Network Industry Reforms in Developing Countries:
The Telecommunications and Electricity Regulation Database." AEI-Brookings Joint Center
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Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Mobile penetration (subscribers per 100 pop) 449 9.93 17.31 0 105.64
GDP pc (US$ 2000) 450 2,783.39 1,873.62 299.87 8,234.93
Share of private credit (% GDP) 443 44.83 34.12 0 165.72
Openness (% GDP) 443 80.57 40.42 13.75 228.87
Multilateral debt (% public debt) 422 30.98 23.03 0 96.79
Mobile revenue per subscriber (US$) 329 807.99 2,030.18 39.83 26,873.31
Fixed revenue per subscriber (US$) 410 981.84 4,192.07 71.96 53,509.78
Source: ITU, World Bank
Table 1: Summary Statistics
The variable for privatization is an indicator which takes value one when the
xed incumbent has been privatized and zero otherwise. Privatization is dened
in this paper as the sale of more than 50% of the incumbents shares by the
government. Similarly, the liberalization dummy takes value one if competition
for long-distance services is permitted.
Regarding privatization, the data collected by Henisz, Zelner and Guillen
(2004) for the period up to 1999 were updated using the World Bank Privati-
zation Database and other publications.16 The liberalization variable was also
drawn from Henisz, Zelner and Guillen (2004) and was updated using case stud-
ies from a variety of sources.
The countries considered in the analysis are very diverse, as shown in the
summary statistics in Table 1. Even though all the countries in the sample are
characterized by the World Bank as low and middle-income, the level of GDP
per capita in constant dollars ranges from USD 300 to more than USD 8,000.
Similarly, if we only restrict our attention to the last year in the sample, the
number of mobile subscribers per 100 inhabitants (mobile penetration) ranges
from 7 in Kenya to 105 in the Czech Republic in 2004. For this variable, the
table excludes the 35 observations for which mobile penetration is zero, i.e. the
years in which countries in the sample had not yet launched a mobile telephony
service.
In the Table 1, and in all the estimated equations, monetary variables are
included on an exchange rate basis, in constant 2000 US dollars, rather than in
PPP terms. This approach follows, for instance, Röller and Waverman (2001),
Cubbin and Stern (2006), Gutierrez (2003), Estache et al. (2006) and the panel
data analysis in Waverman et al. (2005).
When looking at the behavior of the variables across time, it appears, not
surprisingly, that mobile penetration and GDP per capita, as well as capital
and labour per capita, show an upward trend. Conversely, other variables, such
as the index of political constraints (Polcon), show little variation over time.
As explained further in the next section, we explicitly take into account in the
estimation the various considerations on the dynamic behavior of the variables,
especially mobile penetration and GDP per capita.
Related Publication 04-05. March 2004.
16http://rru.worldbank.org/Privatization/
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The variables regarding sector reform are summarized in Figure 2, which
shows higher mobile penetration in countries that have implemented di¤erent
types of reforms (telecommunications law, separate regulator, liberalization of
long-distance services and majority privatization of the incumbent) compared
to the others. At rst glance, this would suggest the reform may well have had
a positive impact on penetration.
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
Yes No
Law
Separate
Competition
Privatization
Figure 2: Mobile Subscribers per 100 Inhabitants
It is interesting to note that the countries that have reformed the telecom-
munications sector by 2004 almost coincide with the entire sample. Out of 30
countries, 26 have enacted a law reforming the telecommunications sector and
most of them had done so by year 2000. In theory this could reduce the degree
of inter-country variation needed to identify the e¤ect of regulatory reform; but,
in practice, the time dimension from the very di¤erent dates at which countries
introduced their reforms should provide the necessary variation to discriminate
between countries.
In order to analyze di¤erences across countries in the timing of reform, the
age of the regulator is a good proxy. It also provides an indication of the
authoritys sta¤expertise and reputation, which may be important in addressing
the commitment problem. Figure 3 shows a histogram of the age of the regulator
as of 2004, the last year in the sample. The variable indicates the number of
years since the establishment of the regulator, starting with the year after the
law introducing a regulator was passed.17 The average age is around 6 years
and the median is 5, that is around half the regulators have more than 5 years
of operation.
17The rst group includes countries that do not have a separate regulator or that passed
the law in 2004. The second group includes countries that passed the law establishing the
regulator in 2001 - 2003, i.e. age of the regulator is between 1 and 3 years. The third group
consists of countries that passed the law in 1997 - 2000 (i.e. age is between 4 and 7 included),
while the fourth includes those that passed the law between 1990 and 1996. The last includes
only the Philippines, that established a regulator before the rst year in the sample, i.e. 1990.
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Telecom
Law
Separate
Regulator
License Fee
Funding Competition Privatization
Telecom Law 1
Separate Regulator 0.6147 1
License Fee Funding 0.4389 0.6543 1
Competition 0.4358 0.2980 0.0469 1
Privatization 0.4591 0.4940 0.1355 0.2675 1
Table 2: Correlation Matrix
0
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10
12
14
0 years 1 - 3 years 4-7 years 8-14 years > 14 years
Figure 3: Age of the Regulator
The correlation between the di¤erent elements of regulatory reform is shown
in Table 2. However, the correlation between enacting a modern telecom law
and having a separate regulator is high, but weaker than expected. This is due
to a number of countries that do not have a separate regulator even though
they have passed a sector law (Benin, Chile and China as of 2004) and vice
versa (Gambia and Surinam). In addition, most countries that have privatized
the xed incumbent operator have also introduced some liberalization measures
in the long-distance market, even though the two events have not usually been
contemporaneous. In consequence, the degree of inter-correlation on the regula-
tory variables that we nd for telecommunications is quite high but lower than
Cubbin and Stern (2006) found for electricity.
The relationship between GDP per capita and the rate of mobile penetration
is crucial to this paper and is plotted in Figure 4. The two variables exhibit a
positive correlation, in line with expectations. In addition, the wide variation
which was highlighted in the summary statistics is also clearly visible in the
graph. Finally, the positive relationship is consistent both with (a) GDP driving
mobile subscription, a demand-side e¤ect; and (b) mobile availability and usage
increasing GDP, a supply-side e¤ect. We discuss the implications of this in the
next section.
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Figure 4: Income and Mobile Penetration (2004)
5 Econometric Methodology
On the basis of the discussion above, the variables that are considered endoge-
nous in the present analysis are (i) the penetration rate of mobile telecommu-
nications, (ii) GDP per capita and (iii) a measure of regulatory governance.
Hence, we need a three equation model, which consists of an equation describ-
ing the behavior of telecommunications penetration and two further equations
for the other potentially endogenous variables.
The actual model that we estimate is set out below. In the basic formulation
of the system, it is assumed that the three endogenous variables have an impact
only on the contemporaneous values of other endogenous variables i.e. we as-
sume no lagged e¤ects. Other restrictions, derived from the previous discussion,
are also imposed in the following equations.
The estimation relies on a panel of countries over time from 1990 to 2004, and
we assume that the parameters of the model are constant both across countries
and over time.
The penetration of mobile subscribers (PENit) in country i at time t, is
assumed to be a function of the other potentially endogenous variables in the
system, per capita income (GDPpcit) and regulatory governance (RGit) and
of some exogenous variables. This gives us the following equation for mobile
penetration rates:
lnPENit = 0;i + 1 lnGDPpcit + 2 RGit + 3 lnPMit + 4 lnPFit (1)
+5 lnDensityit + 6 ln InvRatioit + 7 Pr ivatit + 8Liberalit
+t + "1;it
The variables that we treat as exogenous are: PMit, the average price of
mobile telecommunications services; PFit, the average price of xed telecommu-
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nications services; Densityit, the country population density;18 and InvRatioit,
the telecommunications investment/GDP ratio (as in Ros (1999)). Moreover, as
privatization and liberalization are likely to a¤ect penetration, these variables
are also included in the mobile penetration equation. "1;it is an error term for
this rst equation. We also include time dummies, t.
In the above equation, for the reasons discussed in the previous section, the
estimated coe¢ cients on and in (1) are expected be positive. The estimated co-
e¢ cient on InvRatioit is also expected to be positive (because more investment
allows higher usage in a supply constrained industry) as is that on Densityit
(because it is more cost e¢ cient for the operators to cover densely populated
areas).
Regarding the price of services, standard demand considerations imply that
a higher price of mobile services (PMit) is likely to depress penetration, while
an increase in the price of xed services (PFit) should encourage a switch to the
mobile network. Hence, the estimated coe¢ cient on the mobile price is expected
to be negative and that on the price of xed services positive. Lastly, the e¤ects
of xed line privatization and liberalization are indeterminate. They may have
a negative e¤ect on mobile penetration, as it may be sensible to assume that
those reforms would improve availability and quality of xed services. However,
there are also reasons why the impact could be positive e.g. if one of the mobile
operators is part of a newly commercialized incumbent xed line operator.
The equations describing the other two potentially endogenous variables are:
lnGDPpcit = 0;i + 1Insti;t 1 + 2 lnPENit + 3 lnKit + (2)
4 lnHKit + 5 lnOpennessit + t + "2;it
RGit = 0;i + 1Insti;t 1 + 2 lnGDPpcit + 3 ln IntlEffectit (3)
+4 Pr ivatit + 5Liberalit + t + "3;it
The equation for GDP per head takes the form of an aggregate production
function, but a production function that also includes mobile telecoms as an
input. In this equation, Insti;t 1 is a proxy for country institutions, HKit is
a proxy for human capital, Kit is a measure of physical capital, Opennessit is
the ratio between trade and GDP, t are time dummies and "2;it is an error
term. In the model that we estimate, it is assumed that country institutions
are pre-determined. For this reason, we include in the system , which pre-date
the period of analysis, rather than Insti,t on the grounds that institutions in
previous years cannot be a¤ected by income levels in subsequent periods (see
Rajan and Zingales, 1998; Esfahani and Ramirez, 2003 for previous use of this
approach). All variables in equation (2) are expected to have a positive e¤ect
on income levels.
18As an alternative, the signicance of the percentage of rural population is also tested.
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In equation (3) regulation is modelled as a dummy variable, which takes
the value of 1 if a given characteristic (e.g. sector law or separate regulator)
is present and zero otherwise. Di¤erent measures of good regulationwill be
employed in the estimation. We treat regulation as an endogenous variable in
this model, and it is assumed that the choice of whether to have a regulatory
framework in place depends on country institutions and some other factors. As
argued in the previous Section, the other factors that we consider include the
country income level (GDPpcit) and pressure by international organizations
(e.g. conditionality conditions imposed by international nancial institutions),
as proxied by multilateral lending (IntlEffectit). "3;it is the error term for
equation (3).
The functional form of the third equation is a linear probability model. While
this model does not constrain predicted values to lie in the interval between 0 and
1 (Greene, 2003), it is particularly suitable for estimation in a multi-equation
system. In order to alleviate the potential problem of out-of-range estimates, we
check predicted probabilities after estimation to verify that they belong within
the correct interval.
As we have a panel data set, we include country-specic xed e¤ects in all
three equations. The xed e¤ects approach allows for correlation between the
country-specic intercept and the regressors and is therefore less restrictive than
the random e¤ects model in this context. Therefore, in line with other studies
on regulatory institutions (e.g. Estache, Goicoechea and Manacorda, 2006) and
on the impact of telecommunications of GDP (Röller and Waverman, 2001),
the model is estimated under the hypothesis of xed e¤ects. However, to test
the appropriateness of this specication, we test the results against a random
e¤ects model.
Finally, year dummies are included to account for period e¤ects common to
all the countries in the sample.
6 Results
This section is divided into two main parts. In the rst part, we report estimates
of each equation estimated separately and, in the second part, we report the
system estimates.
It is useful to present the results obtained estimating each equation sepa-
rately. This can provide a better insight on the data and can be also used as
a comparison for the coe¢ cients when the equations are jointly estimated as a
system. In addition, separate estimation of each equation implies that, although
system interactions are not fully captured, specication errors in any individual
equation are not transmitted to the other equations.
6.1 Equation-by-Equation Estimates: Equation 1
The results for the penetration of mobile services (Equation 1) are shown in
Table 3. The specications shown provide estimates from random e¤ects (Col-
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umn 1) and xed e¤ects (Column 2) models. The third column shows results
for a xed e¤ect model, where insignicant variables have been removed, ex-
cept for the logarithm of GDP per capita which is one of the key variables
of interest in the present study. All columns include time dummies to take
account of any common cross-country time period e¤ects.19 The reported stan-
dard errors are robust to heteroscedasticity and serial correlation.20 All the
explanatory variables in Table 3 are treated as exogenous, except for Column
5 which reports the results of using an instrumental variable (IV) estimator.
For comparison purposes, Column 4 reports standard errors that are not robust
to heteroscedasticity and serial correlation. Given that robust standard errors
are not available for the system estimation, we check that this adjustment does
not a¤ect the signicance of the estimates. The di¤erences arising from this
correction are very small, as shown by comparing Columns 3 and 4.
All the estimated equations in Table 3 (and Tables 6 - 7) are static equations
which provide estimates of long-run coe¢ cients.21
Evidence regarding the main explanatory variables, and , is mixed. The
dummy indicating the presence of a regulator is signicant but, when the ex-
istence of a telecommunications law and independent funding of the regulator
are used as proxies for an autonomous regulator they are not signicant either
in a xed e¤ects model or in a random e¤ects model.
Counter to expectations, the age of the regulator has a signicant negative
coe¢ cient. However, the implication of this result is far from clear-cut. Omit-
ting the time dummies leads to a signicant and positive coe¢ cient. Hence, in
this case time series data cannot identify the e¤ect of the variable even with a
cross-section dimension. This appears to be due to the fact that mobile telecom-
munications usage has far stronger trend elements than, for instance, electricity
generation capacity or xed line telecommunication penetration growth, at least
in our sample of developing countries.22
The logarithm of GDP per capita is not signicant in a xed e¤ects model
but its coe¢ cient becomes signicant and markedly larger when a random e¤ects
model is estimated. This may seem to indicate that the heterogeneity across
countries, as represented by di¤erent income levels, is absorbed by the xed
e¤ects, while within country variation provided by GDP per capita seems to
play a more limited role as indicated by an insignicant coe¢ cient when time
dummies are included.
In line with expectations, the coe¢ cient on the price of mobile services is
19When a time trend was included, instead of time dummies, the coe¢ cients had the same
sign and were slightly larger.
20This adjustment follows the result in Wooldridge, J. M. (2002), Econometric Analysis of
Cross Section and Panel Data, MIT Press (Chapter 10). It allows both for heteroscedasticity
and for correlation across observations for the same country.
21After estimating the model, we performed residual diagnostics and found residuals were
well-behaved. Moreover, outliers and leverages were very few and did not a¤ect the main
results.
22 In an alternative specication, the age of the regulator was modeled as a set of dummy
variables, none of which was signicant. Moreover, lagged values of the regulatory variable (1
to 3 lags) were not signicant unless time dummies were excluded from the specication.
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Dependent variable: Ln mobile penetration 1990 ? 2004
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Random Fixed FE Uncorrected IV
Effects Effects omitting non
significant
variables
Std. errors
Ln GDP pc 1.103 0.353 0.368 0.368 0.113
[0.130]*** [1.179] [1.003] [0.439] [0.656]
Separate
regulator
0.366 0.389 0.452 0.452 0.463
[0.185]** [0.228]* [0.185]** [0.109]*** [0.111]***
Price mobile -0.00038 -0.00039 -0.00038 -0.00038 -0.00039
[0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]***
Price fixed -0.000 0.000
[0.000] [0.000]
Majority privat. 0.150 0.141
[0.208] [0.262]
Liberalization -0.282 -0.349 -0.364 -0.364 -0.356
[0.164]* [0.171]** [0.154]** [0.105]*** [0.107]***
Ln Investment
ratio
0.295 0.268 0.307 0.307 0.313
[0.106]*** [0.112]** [0.102]*** [0.055]*** [0.059]***
Ln Pop. Density 0.128 0.946
[0.100] [2.729]
Constant -10.266 -8.310 -4.337 -4.337 -2.388
[1.323]*** [16.930] [7.686] [3.350] [4.987]
Fixed Effects No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Corrected std.
errors
Yes Yes Yes No No
R-squared 0.8711 0.6095 0.7705 0.7705 0.6996
Countries 30 30 30 30 29
Observations 307 307 311 311 301
Notes: * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Standard errors in brackets under
coefficients; corrected std. errors are robust to heteroscedasticity and serial correlation. In column 5, GDP per
capita is treated as endogenous and instrumented with labour per capita, capital per capita and lagged credit
ratio (the regressors in Equation 2), in addition to the other exogenous variables included in Equation 1.
Table 3: Results for Equation 1
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negative (and statistically signicant at the 1% level). The rate of telecommuni-
cations investment makes a strong and highly signicant positive contribution to
mobile penetration, strongly supporting the notion of mobile penetration being
supply constrained in developing countries.
The negative coe¢ cient on the dummy Liberalization, which indicates the
opening to competition of long-distance services provided on xed networks,
seems to suggest substitutability between xed and mobile services, which is
particularly likely in developing countries, as discussed earlier in the paper.
The results from the IV estimator in Column 5, where GDP per capita is
treated as endogenous and instrumented with the exogenous explanatory vari-
ables in Equation 2 are very similar to those in Columns 1-4. These instrumental
variables estimates provide an intermediate step between the results in Columns
1 4 and the full system estimates. In Table 3, the instruments for GDP per capita
are only exogenous variables. In the system (Section 6.2), one of the regressors
is mobile penetration, which is assumed to be determined jointly with GDP per
capita in the system.
Throughout the analysis, the xed e¤ects model was considered the basis
for the estimates, as is very often the case with models like those estimated in
Table 3. By allowing for correlation between the regressors in Equation 1 and
the country-specic unobserved e¤ect, the xed e¤ects model is more suitable
than the random e¤ects estimator in the present setting and less restrictive in
its underlying assumptions. The standard procedure in these circumstances is
to compare xed e¤ects and random e¤ects estimators using the Hausman test.
In our case, the test results were not conclusive. However, we prefer the xed
e¤ects estimator for the reasons explained above. Therefore, in the rest of the
paper we focus primarily on xed e¤ects models and report the random e¤ects
estimates for comparison.
As mentioned above, the main di¤erence between the results from the xed
e¤ects and the random e¤ects estimators is that the coe¢ cient on GDP per
capita becomes signicant in the random e¤ects model. However, it is unclear
whether this reects, at least in part, that GDP per capita is acting as a proxy
for other variables (e.g. general country governance) which are captured by the
country-specic intercept in the xed e¤ects model.
In order to investigate these issues, an alternative approach could be to
replace the unobserved xed e¤ects with environmental variables or to group
countries on the basis of geography or other criteria (e.g. see Durlauf et al.,
2005). Such an analysis is beyond the scope of the present paper but is a topic
for further work.
6.1.1 Dynamic Single Equation Models
The specication proposed so far is static while, similarly to the models esti-
mated in the growth literature, it may be argued that the penetration of mobile
phones in the current period is a¤ected by penetration in previous periods. For
instance, Gutierrez (2003) and Cubbin and Stern (2006) nd evidence that the
lags of the dependent variable have signicant and large coe¢ cients. This for-
18
mulation assumes that the impact of past values of the regressors is persistent
and is captured by the coe¢ cient on the lagged dependent variable.
For this reason, the following dynamic model seems more appropriate.
lnPENit = 0;i + 1 lnPENi;t 1 + 2 lnPENi;t 2 + 1 lnGDPpcit + 2 RGit(4)
+3 lnPMit + 4 lnPFit + 5 lnDensityit + 6 ln InvRatioit
+7 Pr ivatit + 8Liberalit + t + "1;it
For comparison purposes, we rstly report results from the dynamic equation
estimated with xed e¤ects (Table 4) and then we compare the results with those
obtained using the Arellano and Bond estimator (Table 5).
The dynamic model (Table 4) broadly conrms the results in Section 6.1
above. In particular, on the basis of the estimated coe¢ cient on the regulatory
variable (0.019), the corresponding long-run coe¢ cient would be 0.1.23 This is
signicant, but lower than the coe¢ cient obtained in the static model (0.452
in Table 3) and the estimates in Gutierrez (2003), which is 0.36.24 Moreover,
the estimates in Table 4 highlight the importance of lagged values of mobile
penetration.
The results in Table 4 are subject to a degree of bias. When the number
of time periods is small (T = 15 in our sample), the xed e¤ects estimator of
a dynamic model is biased. This is due to the correlation between the lags of
the dependent variable and the error term in the model. For this reason, as in
Gutierrez (2003), the Arellano and Bond (1991) estimator is used in order to
overcome the bias created by the introduction of lagged values of the dependent
variable in Equation 4.
We report the results from the Arellano-Bond estimator in Table 5. In the
rst column, all explanatory variables are included and is treated as endogenous.
In order to limit the size of the instrument matrix, which can increase very
quickly with the number of endogenous or predetermined variables, and which
depends on the number of time periods in the panel, the maximum number
of lags that can be used as instruments is set to 4. In addition, is considered
pre-determined in the second column. While coe¢ cients appear broadly similar
in size and signicance between the two columns, the latter model is more
computationally demanding.
Compared with Gutierrez (2003), who estimates the model for xed line
penetration, the coe¢ cient on is pretty similar (Gutierrez nds 0.7748 and
0.7287 depending on the specication) and the coe¢ cient on GDP per capita is
higher.25
There are some common conclusions that can be drawn from the estimates of
the dynamic models in Tables 4 and 5. In both cases, unlike the static models of
23Therefore, the establishment of a separate regulator would be associated, in the long-run,
to a level of mobile penetration higher by about 11%.
24Gutierrez (2003), Table 6, Column 1.
25Gutierrez (2003) treats liberalization, privatization and regulation as predetermined vari-
ables.
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Dependent variable: Ln mobile penetration 1990 ? 2004
Ln mobile penetration (t-1) 1.099
[0.070]***
Ln mobile penetration (t-2) -0.282
[0.058]***
Ln GDP pc 0.168
[0.040]***
Separate regulator 0.019
[0.045]***
Liberalization -0.010
[0.035]
Majority privatization 0.020
[0.034]
Price mobile -0.00011
[0.000]**
Price fixed -0.00014
[0.000]*
Ln Investment ratio 0.124
[0.031]***
Ln Population Density -0.004
[0.018]
Constant -0.648
[0.356]*
Time dummies Yes
Countries 30
Observations 287
Notes: * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Standard errors in brackets under
coefficients are robust to heteroscedasticity.
Table 4: Dynamic Specication for Equation 1 (Fixed E¤ects)
Table 3, the estimated coe¢ cient on GDP per capita is signicant and positive.
This holds both for the xed e¤ects estimator and the Arellano-Bond estimator,
even though in the latter case it is much larger.26 Further similarities between
Tables 4 and 5 include the signicance of the price of mobile services and of the
investment ratio. However, in both cases again, the estimated coe¢ cients using
the Arellano-Bond method are larger.
Regarding the policy variables, the main di¤erence between the results in Ta-
bles 4 and 5 is that the dummy representing the regulatory variable is signicant
in the xed e¤ects model but insignicant with the Arellano-Bond estimator.
Moreover, contrasting results are also obtained on liberalization and privatiza-
tion. Both variables are insignicant in the xed e¤ects model, but become
signicant when the equation is estimated using the Arellano-Bond estimator.
Neither of the alternative dynamic model estimates are entirely reliable, as
the estimators used in this Section are not ideal for our sample. The results
in Table 4 are biased due to the small number of time periods in the sample,
although the degree of bias should be relatively small.27 The Arellano-Bond
estimator addresses this issue under the assumption of a small number of time
26The Arellano-Bond estimator treats the country-specic intercepts are random e¤ects and
this may explain the similarity of the coe¢ cient on GDP per capita with that obtained for
the static model using a random e¤ects estimator (1.103 in Table 3).
27Nickell (1981) nds that, in an autoregressive model of order 1, if the coe¢ cient on the
lag of the dependent variable is 0.5 the bias is -0.167 (assuming 10 time periods).
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Dependent variable: Ln mobile penetration 1990 ? 2004
(1) (2)
Endogenous
GDP
Endog. GDP and
pre-determined
regulation
Ln mobile penetration (t-1) 0.805 0.786
[0.047]*** [0.047]***
Ln mobile penetration (t-2) -0.165 -0.158
[0.045]*** [0.046]***
Ln GDP pc 1.104 1.212
[0.626]* [0.570]**
Separate regulator 0.048 0.063
[0.079] [0.103]
Liberalization -0.137 -0.161
[0.057]** [0.051]***
Majority privat. -0.120 -0.083
[0.067]* [0.072]
Price mobile -0.00023 -0.00024
[0.000]** [0.000]**
Price fixed -0.000 -0.000
[0.000] [0.000]
Ln Investment ratio 0.147 0.136
[0.050]*** [0.047]***
Ln pop. Density 0.195 0.380
[0.967] [1.001]
Constant -0.051 -0.045
[0.105] [0.103]
Time dummies Yes Yes
Wald test 3989.83 3702.73
2nd order serial correlation - 0.22 - 0.18
p-value 0.8296 0.8564
Countries 30 30
Observations 254 254
Notes: * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Standard errors in brackets under
coefficients in all columns are robust to heteroscedasticity. The Arellano-Bond test for 2nd order serial
correlation fails to reject the null hypothesis of no serial correlation in the residuals.
Table 5: Dynamic Specication for Equation 1 (Arellano-Bond)
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periods and a number of cross-sections going to innity.28 However, in our
study the size of the cross-section dimension is relatively small compared to the
number of time periods. For this reason, the estimator is also far from ideal29
either for our sample or for the dataset in Gutierrez (2003).30
Nevertheless, each estimation method provides useful and corroborative evi-
dence on the sizeable and signicant impact of per capita GDP and telecommu-
nications investment on mobile penetration. The long-run coe¢ cients on these
variables are 0.92 and 0.68, respectively (Table 4), as compared to 0.368 and
0.307 in Column 3 of Table 3 for the static model.
6.2 Equation-by-Equation Estimates: Equation 2
The results for Equation (2), the GDP per capita production function are shown
in Table 5, We estimate this equation taking as proxy measures of the quality of
country institution both (a) the Polcon index and (b) the logarithm of the share
of credit to GDP. As in our estimate of Equation (1), all explanatory variables
are considered exogenous and year dummies are included. Results from xed
e¤ects (Column 1) and random e¤ects (Column 2) models are provided, and
standard errors are robust to heteroscedasticity and serial correlation, except
for Column 4, which shows the impact of this adjustment on the signicance of
the coe¢ cients.31
The coe¢ cient of the impact of mobile penetration on GDP per capita is
positive and signicant in all specications, as expected and as found in Waver-
man et al. (2005). Its size is also robust to alternative specications. Compared
to Waverman et al. (2005), who obtain an estimate of 0.075 in their panel data
model, the magnitude of our estimate (0.014) is signicantly smaller.32
However, the proxies used for country institutions are never signicant and
this conrms the low correlation found between these variables and the loga-
rithm of GDP per capita in the present sample, both at a cross-section level and
within a given country. While this result may be attributable to the poor quality
of the measures used in the study, it may also be a symptom of a methodological
issue or some other underlying factors.
Finally, a methodological issue arises from the choice of the time horizon
28 In their article, Arellano and Bond (1991) apply the estimator to an unbalanced panel of
140 companies over at least 7 periods.
29Recognizing the importance for applied work of panels where the cross-section and time
dimensions are of similar size, Alvarez and Arellano (2003) investigate the properties of the
estimator when they both go to innity. Concerns on the small sample properties of the
Arellano-Bond estimator, due to the large size of the instrument matrix, are for instance
discussed in Kiviet (1995).
30That dataset includes 22 countries over 18 years.
31The correction to standard errors a¤ects the signicance of the coe¢ cient on the lagged
credit ratio.
32The results are not directly comparable, as Waverman et al (2005) transform penetration
as PEN / (35 PEN). In addition, Waverman et al. (2005) prefer the estimates from the cross-
section model, which implies that if, in a given country, there were one additional mobile
phone for 100 people the country would experience a per capita GDP growth higher by 0.059
percent.
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Dependent variable: Ln GDP per capita 1990 ? 2004
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Random
Effects
Fixed Effects FE omitting
non
significant
variables
Uncorrected
Std. errors
Fixed
Effects
(Polcon)
Ln Credit/GDP (t ? 1) 0.023 0.032 0.033 0.033
[0.027] [0.028] [0.030] [0.011]***
Ln Mobile penetration 0.014 0.016 0.014 0.014 0.013
[0.005]*** [0.005]*** [0.005]*** [0.003]*** [0.005]***
Ln Labor/pop. -0.228 -0.260
[0.231] [0.246]
Ln Capital/pop. 0.662 0.563 0.576 0.576 0.604
[0.048]*** [0.053]*** [0.051]*** [0.028]*** [0.047]***
Ln Openness -0.004 0.011
[0.038] [0.037]
Polcon (t ? 1) -0.007
[0.033]
Constant 1.614 2.351 2.516 2.516 2.393
[0.443]*** [0.438]*** [0.418]*** [0.233]*** [0.405]***
Fixed Effects No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Corrected std. errors Yes Yes Yes No Yes
R-squared 0.9456 0.9398 0.9419 0.9419 0.9471
Countries 29 29 29 29 28
Observations 380 380 382 382 376
Notes: * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Standard errors in brackets under
coefficients in all columns are robust to heteroscedasticity and serial correlation.
Countries: capital is not available for Fiji; Polcon is not available for Suriname.
Table 6: Results for Equation 2
in the GDP equation. The theoretical models that inform empirical studies
generally address the question of steady-state growth. As a result, empirical
growth studies have traditionally used cross-sections of countries, where data for
each country were averaged over long periods of time. However, the estimation
of growth models relies increasingly on panels where data have been averaged
over ve or ten years. This raises the question of whether it is appropriate to
use long-run models to interpret short-intervals of data (Levine, 2005; Durlauf,
Johnson and Temple, 2005) and this potential pitfall seems even more acute if
annual data are used.
6.3 Equation-by-Equation Estimates: Equation 3
Finally, our estimates of Equation (3) for the presence or absence of a telecom-
munications regulator are reported in Table 6. They provide no evidence of any
systematic link between country institutions and regulatory governance. This
is counter to the results in Gual and Trillas (2006). However, we conrm their
nding that Polcon (which, when lagged, we interpret as a measure of political
stability) is not signicant in a model explaining an index of regulatory quality.
Another interesting result from their analysis that we corroborate is the nding
that the creation of an independent regulator is not systematically related to
the level of GDP per capita.
The specications shown in Table 6 (Equation 3) compare estimates from
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Dependent variable: Separate regulator (Yes/No)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Fixed
Effects
(Polcon)
FE
Omitting not
significant
vars
Fixed
Effects
(Credit)
FE
Omitting not
significant
vars
Ln GDP per capita 0.000 -0.022 -0.043 -0.081
[0.410] [0.387] [0.418] [0.388]
Polcon (t ? 1) 0.029 0.054
[0.162] [0.156]
Majority privat. 0.361 0.378 0.374 0.376
[0.109]*** [0.107]*** [0.108]*** [0.108]***
Liberalization 0.149 0.153
[0.109] [0.110]
Ln Multilateral lending -0.058 -0.054
[0.053] [0.052]
Ln Credit/GDP (t ? 1) 0.053 0.027
[0.097] [0.084]
Constant 0.754 0.244 0.892 0.608
[3.173] [2.900] [3.152] [2.871]
Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
R-squared 0.3797 0.4086 0.3541 0.3671
Countries 29 29 30 30
Observations 391 404 390 412
Notes: * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Standard errors in brackets under
coefficients in all columns are robust to heteroscedasticity and serial correlation.
Countries: Polcon is not available for Suriname.
Table 7: Results for Equation 3
di¤erent models, all of which include xed e¤ects and time dummies. In the
third column, insignicant variables have been removed, except for the logarithm
of GDP per capita and of the credit variable, which are among the variables of
interest in the present study. Standard errors are robust to heteroscedasticity
and serial correlation and all variables are treated as exogenous. Fitted values
are then computed and it is veried that they lie within the interval between 0
and 1.33
The share of private credit over GDP is the proxy for institutions included in
the other two columns but it does not have any statistically signicant impact.
The equation is relatively unsuccessful in explaining the emergence of a
telecommunications regulator. The only signicant variable, once xed e¤ects
and time dummies are included in the model, is the dummy indicating the
majority privatization of the incumbent.34 This coe¢ cient is positive and sig-
nicant in all the specications and its value does not change much across the
33 In addition, tted values are compared with the actual values of separate. When there is a
separate regulator (i.e. separate = 1), the median of the tted values is 0.8 and three-quarters
of the values are greater than 0.69. The model correctly predicts the existence of a separate
regulator in about 71% of observations (i.e. the tted values are between a threshold value
we set at 0.5 and 1). When there is not a separate regulator (i.e. separate = 0), the median
of the tted values is 0.16 and three-quarters of the values are less than 0.3. However, the
tted values are between 0 and the threshold value of 0.5 for only 58% of the observations.
34 If errors are not corrected for heteroscedasticity and serial correlation, liberalization is
also signicant.
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di¤erent models. When the dependent variable is the dummy indicating that
a telecommunications law was passed in the country, the liberalization of long-
distance services is also signicant while coe¢ cients of other variables are similar
to the results in Table 6. However, telecom regulators are frequently established
as part of a package with liberalization and privatization with one law covering
all three. This is consistent with the commonly made observation that an inde-
pendent regulator is frequently introduced when governments wish to privatize
state-owned infrastructure companies.
Finally, as a robustness check, the equation was re-estimated for the subset
of observations used in the system. In addition, a logit model including the
same variables was estimated. Both models conrmed the results presented in
Table 7. The estimates from the logit model are reported in Appendix 3.
6.4 System Estimates
The system of simultaneous equations given by Equations (1) (3) is estimated
by three-stage least squares, where all right-hand variables are considered ex-
ogenous, and used as instruments, while the proxy for country institutions, i.e.
the ratio of private credit to GDP, is treated as pre-determined and lagged one
period.
The results are presented in Table 8. Fixed e¤ects and time dummies are
included in all equations.
In the rst column, the signs and signicance of the coe¢ cients conrm the
results obtained for the penetration equation (Table 3, Column 4), except for
the separate regulator dummy, whose coe¢ cient is more than double the one
obtained for the single equation and is also clearly statistically signicant at the
1% level. However, the magnitude of the coe¢ cient seems unrealistically high.
In the mobile penetration equation, the other coe¢ cients have broadly the same
sign and magnitude as in the single equation variant, which is an indication of
the general robustness of this relationship.35
Similarly, in the GDP equation in Column 2, the signicant e¤ect of mobile
penetration on GDP per capita is conrmed by the analysis. However, again,
the magnitude of the coe¢ cient is much higher once the endogeneity of the
variables is taken into account (0.044 compared with 0.014 in Table 6, Column
4), but still rather smaller than in Waverman et al. (2005). In addition, the
(lagged) credit-GDP ratio is also strongly signicant.
Finally, in the last equation to explain the presence or absence of an in-
dependent regulator (Column 3), the results are again disappointing and add
little to the model. The liberalization of xed services and the privatization
of the incumbent are associated with higher probability that the country es-
tablishes a separate regulator. This is in line with expectations but provides
little additional insight into the underlying causes of when and why independent
regulators are introduced.
35The coe¢ cient on liberalization is - 0.364 and the coe¢ cient on the investment ratio is
0.307 in the estimates of Equation 1.
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Ln Mobile
penetration
Ln GDP per capita Separate regulator
Ln GDP per capita 0.360
[0.582]
Separate regulator 1.099
[0.381]***
Price mobile -0.00040
[0.000]***
Ln Investment ratio 0.303
[0.052]***
Liberalization -0.417 0.208
[0.126]*** [0.054]***
Ln Credit/GDP (t ? 1) 0.035 -0.018
[0.013]*** [0.066]
Ln Mobile penetration 0.044
[0.010]***
Ln Capital/pop. 0.531
[0.040]***
Majority privat. 0.308
[0.069]***
Constant 0.000 3.422 0.000
[0.000] [0.409]*** [0.000]
Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes
Time Dummies Yes Yes Yes
R-squared 0.9558 0.9966 0.7603
Observations 297 297 297
Notes: * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
Table 8: Results for the System
Modelling the development of economic institutions in general is far from
easy (e.g. see examples in Acemoglu et al., 2005). Regarding telecommuni-
cations regulatory agencies, Gual and Trillas (2006) study this issue using a
cross-section of countries, as explained above. This aspect of the analysis needs
further consideration in future work. The problems in estimating this relation-
ship are also revealed in the fact that, in the system results reported in Table
8, around 30% of the predicted values from the equation are outside the 0-1
interval.36
7 Conclusions
This paper studies the link between GDP, mobile telecommunications penetra-
tion and regulatory governance (general and sector-specic) in a sample of low
and middle-income countries over a 15-year period. The main new element in
the analysis is the estimation of a system of simultaneous equations, in which
mobile penetration, income level and a proxy for regulatory governance are all
treated as endogenous. As far as we aware, this is an approach that has not
been adopted elsewhere for infrastructure industry models.
36After estimating the model we performed residual diagnostics. We found that residuals
were well-behaved and outliers were negligible.
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The potential benets from the approach are shown by the noticeably larger
estimate, in the jointly estimated system relative to the single equation, of
the e¤ect of the regulator in the mobile penetration equation. However, the
equation to endogenise the presence of a telecommunications regulator is not
particularly successful either as an explanation of regulatory choices or in adding
extra information to the system.
The other main ndings are:
(i) We nd some evidence that the existence of an autonomous infrastructure
industry regulator increases penetration rates for mobile telecommunications in
developing countries, with estimates varying widely depending on the specica-
tion. However, the results are less robust than in other studies; this may be due
to our relatively simplistic regulatory variable or to the possibility that the role
of regulators is not as crucial for mobile operators as it is in the xed market.
(ii) Other indicators of regulatory governance were, however, not found to
have any signicant impact on mobile penetration rates. For instance, neither
the existence of a sector law nor the funding of the regulator through license fees
had any apparent statistically signicant impact on mobile penetration, both in
the single equation and in the system estimates.
(iii) This study found no systematic e¤ect of general country governance
in a¤ecting mobile penetration or per capita income or regulatory governance.
However, we are unclear whether this is because we have inadequate proxies for
country governance or whether there is genuinely no apparent e¤ect.
(iv) Finally, we nd a sizeable and strongly signicant impact of mobile
telecoms infrastructure on per capita GDP in our sample of developing countries.
This result conrms the ndings of the literature on the economic impact of
infrastructure and is also strongly consistent with the study by Waverman et
al. (2005) on a sample of high and low income countries.
Overall, the results from the system modelling approach on which we have
reported in this paper show that explicitly taking account of endogeneities re-
sults in higher and better-determined coe¢ cients at least for mobile telephony.
This is particularly obvious for the impact of mobile penetration on the level of
GDP per capita. In addition, although our modelling of regulation was not very
successful, the system results indicated a more powerful e¤ect of the presence of
an autonomous regulator on mobile penetration than the single equation results.
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A Construction of Variables
A.1 Telecommunications Penetration
In this study telecommunications penetration is measured in terms of mobile
phones. In less developed countries, mobile phones have shown high growth
rates since their introduction and have proved formidable substitutes for xed
lines. For this reason, mobile telephony cannot be ignored in the analysis and
focusing on xed lines only would not capture the reality of developing countries.
Measuring penetration solely on the basis of mobile lines seems the prefer-
able option, compared to using the total number of lines (i.e. xed and mobile).
In particular, it can be reasonably assumed that regulatory institutions have
a di¤erent impact in markets in which there are competing rms, rather than
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a single state-owned operator. Given that mobile telephony is usually charac-
terized by a certain degree of competition almost from its commercial launch,
the role of regulation appears to be signicantly di¤erent from that exercised
in the xed market, where the development of xed telephony often takes place
for a long time in the absence of competition and the infrastructure is deployed
entirely by a state-owned monopolist.
In fact it could be argued that, in the mobile market, the role of regulators is
not as crucial as it is for the xed market, where the very asymmetric structure
often requires regulatory intervention to grant new entrants access to the por-
tions of the incumbents infrastructure that cannot be economically replicated.
By combining the xed and mobile markets together, one would in fact con-
strain the impact of regulatory institutions to be the same in both, even if the
two markets were in di¤erent stages of development. On the basis of the above
considerations, the variable of interest in the analysis is mobile penetration.
A.2 Explanatory Variables
There are di¤erent variables that are used in the literature as proxy for country
institutions. The institutional characteristics considered in this study are: (a)
protection against expropriation risk (e.g. POLCON index on executive con-
straints37); (b) nancial market development (e.g. share of credit to the private
sector on GDP).38
More specically, it is assumed that the most relevant institutional charac-
teristics that impact the main variables mentioned above are protection against
expropriation risk (e.g. POLCON index on executive constraints) and nan-
cial market development.39 In particular, it has been shown that protection
against expropriation risk a¤ects GDP per capita and investment positively in
a cross-section of countries (Acemoglu and Johnson, 2005).
In addition, a large body of literature (e.g. review by Levine, 2005) estimate
that nancial sector development has a positive impact on per capita GDP,
by facilitating those sectors which are typically more dependent on access to
external funding. This factor may also be important for investment in the
37POLCON III from Henisz, W. J. (2002). "The Institutional Environment for Infrastruc-
ture Investment." Industrial and Corporate Change 11(2).
38Another important aspect of a countrys endowment is given by the functioning of the legal
system, measured for instance by an index of procedural complexity. Djankov et al. (2003) nd
that higher procedural formalism is a strong predictor of longer duration of dispute resolution
[and] higher corruption. Formalism is dened by Djankov et al. (2003) as the extent to which
regulation causes dispute resolution to deviate from the neighbor model. They refer to the
neighbor model as a situation in which a controversy is resolved by a third on fairness grounds
without resorting to courts. Given that regulatorsdecisions are normally subject to appeal to
courts, the threat of litigation may represent a constraint for the regulator to provide good
decisions. This threat is credible only if the legal system is capable of dealing with it e¢ ciently
and justly. Unfortunately, this dimension cannot be captured in a panel setting due to data
limitations.
39These variables di¤er from those used in Gual and Trillas (2006), which are not available
for the whole time frame of the present study.
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telecommunications industry, especially due to the large investments required.40
In addition to the variables described in the text, other variables that may
a¤ect telecommunications penetration are the average price of mobile services
and the average price of xed services. These are also measured in constant
U.S. dollars, consistently with GDP per capita. They are calculated as service
revenue divided by mobile subscribers and by total mainlines, respectively.41
The share of investment on GDP is obtained from annual telecommunica-
tion investment, which includes equipment as well as land, buildings and non-
tangible assets both for xed and mobile services. Other variables, such as
population density and the percentage of urban population, are included in the
analysis to account for di¤erent operating conditions across countries.
In the GDP per capita equation, in addition to the variables already de-
scribed above, the following variables are included. Human capital is proxied
by labour force and physical capital stock is from Miketa (2004), and is calcu-
lated using the perpetual inventory method in US$ at constant 2000 prices.42
Openness is dened as the sum of exports and imports of goods and services as
a share of GDP.
The variable measuring the e¤ect of international pressure is multilateral
debt service, which is dened as the sum of interest and principal due to the
World Bank, regional development banks, and other multilateral agencies, as a
percentage of public and publicly guaranteed debt service.
B Results from a Logit Model for Equation 3
Equation 3 was estimated using a logit model in order to check the results
in the main text. The results presented below conrm the signicance of the
privatization dummy, as in Table 7 from the text. However, the results are from
a random e¤ects model, as the model did not converge when xed e¤ects were
included.
40For developing countries, other factors may be important, such as loans from international
institutions and foreign direct investment.
41The average price of xed services is calculated so as to include also revenue from public
payphones. Total xed revenues are then divided by the number of mainlines, which includes
not only xed subscribers but also public payphones. Given that the average price of any
type of xed services may be a factor explaining the substitution e¤ect between xed and
mobile services, it seems appropriate to take also public phones into account, as these are
often important means of communication in low and middle-income countries. Moreover, it
could be argued that prices should be expressed in relative terms, compared with the general
level of prices in a given country. However, already provides an indication of the cross-country
di¤erences which are also likely to be reected in consumerspurchasing power. Therefore, in
line with Röller and Waverman (2001) and Waverman et al. (2005), and are included in the
penetration equation.
42Miketa, A., 2004: Technical description on the growth study datasets.
Environmentally Compatible Energy Strategies Program, International Insti-
tute for Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA), Laxenburg, Austria, October 2004.
http://www.iiasa.ac.at/ECS/data_am/index.html
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Dependent variable: Separate regulator (Yes/No) 1990 ? 2004
Ln GDP per capita 0.333
[0.665]
Majority privat. 3.960
[1.045]***
Liberalization 0.9619
[1.011]
Ln Multilateral lending -1.331
[0.728]
Ln Credit/GDP (t ? 1) -0.025
[0.016]
Constant -3.750
[5.106]
Fixed Effects No
Time Dummies Yes
Wald chi 135.47
Countries 29
Observations 390
Notes: * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
Standard errors in brackets.
Table 9: Equation 3: Logit Model
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